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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
PIJOJintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
PEGGY ALLRED, aka, PEGGY 
LOVEJOY, aka, THE.LMA ALLRED, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10752 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF FOR 
REHEARING AND AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 
In response to the brief fi,led by Salt Lake City 
together with their petition for rehearing and the brief 
purported to he an amicus curiae brief, but reading with 
all the earmarks of advocacy, we desire to comment 
briefly on some of the cases cited in the briefs and to 
cite other cases apparently ignored by those seeking a 
rehearing. 
American Fork v. Charliere, 43 Utah 231, 134 P. 
739; Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 Utah 170, 106 P. 705; 
2 
Annotated Cases 1912 C 189; Sfote v. Jl,hisser, 118 Utah 
537, 223 P. 2d. 193, were all cited by either the appellant 
or respondent in the initial briefs and have been hereto-
fore considered by the court and add nothi11g to the pres-
ent controversy. 
L'Hote v.
1 
New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 20 Sup. CL 
788, 44 L Ed 693, cited by the City is a case that was 
decided in 1900 on a petition by certain landowners to 
hold in;y-alid an ordinance districting that city as to 
limits in which prostitutes could live and operate. No per-
son purportng to be "any public prostitute or woman 
notoriously abandoned to lewdness" described in the con-
tended ordinance was party to the suit. 
The only fair import of the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in affirming the Louisiana court 
is born in the court's concluding statement at 177 U.S. 
600: 
"Under these circumstances we are of the opinion 
that the ordinance in question is not one of which 
the plaintiffs in error can complain." 
Salt Lake City v. K usse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d. 671 
strongly relied on by the City as indicative of the law 
in Utah is a traffic case dealing with the validity of a 
City ordinance prohibiting driving under the influence of 
intoxicants. rrhe City in their brief neglects to point 
out that the case is a rehearing of Salt Lake City v. 
Kusse[e] reported at 85 P.2d 802 where the, lower court 
8 
was affirmed by a two-two decision with a strong dissent 
by Justice Larsen, concurred in by Justice .Moffat, said 
dissent being incorporated in the opinion on rehe,aring 
at 93 P.2d. at page 675. 
The City contends that the court's ruling applies 
only to Subsections 7 and 8 of the Salt Lake City Ordi-
nance 32-2-1, of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Utah 1965 (See the City's brief in support of re-
hearing page 13). However, the entire ordinance as evi-
denced by its caption refers to sexual intercourse for hire 
and lewd acts - and each subsection 1 through 7, with 
the possible exception of subsection 4 is integrated 
around "sexual intercourse for hire, lewd acts" or both. 
(Subsection ± deals with "making a meretricious dis-
play") and subsection 8 specifically refers to and relates 
back to Sections 1 through 7 inclusive. 
It would appear that the portions of the ordinance 
are not severable as all deal with the same subject matter 
and a partial invalidity must necessarily invalidate the 
entire ordinance. See McQuillin Municipal Corporations, 
3rd Edition Vol. 6 at page 155, Section 20.64 states that 
the question as to whether or not a whole ordinance is 
invalidated by finding part to be invalid must be tested 
hy the severability of the ordinance. Quoting at page 155: 
"It is essential however that the parts upheld fonn 
independently of the invalid portions, a complete 
law in some reasonable aspect so that it may fairly 
he concluded that the council would have enacted 
it without the invalid parts." (Citing cases at 
footnote 89, page 155) 
The same test jndicates that a savings clause is not 
controlling but is only some evidence as to the intent of 
the legislature or council imssing the law or ordinance. 
It seems noteworthy at this point that this court 
speaking through Justice Crockett has already deter-
mined that a solicitation, proposition, or offer of sexual 
intercourse, whether male to female or female to male, 
does not even constitute an actionable tort in the State 
o.f Utah, let alone being a crime. See Sanirns v. Eccles, 
11 Utah 2d 29±, 358 P.2d 3±-t, wherein it js stated: 
"The assumption is usually indulged that most 
solicjtatious occur under such conditions as to 
fall within the well known phrase of Chief Justice 
:Magruder that 'there js no harm in asking' (:Ma-
gruder, Mental and Emotional Djsturbances jn the 
Law of Torts, ±9 Harvard La\Y Revie~w 10:3:3, 
1055). The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Reed 
v . .Maley pertinently observed that an action will 
not lie in favor of a woman against a man who 
without trespass or assault makes such a request; 
and the the reverse is also true; that a man would 
have no right of action against a woman for such 
a solicitation." 
Can we find such an anomaly in the law that a 
factual situation that invades neither the right of the 
public or an jndividual such as to lay the basis for a 
tort my be tortured into a crime by a city commission or 
council when not expressly authorjzed by statutory legis-
lation 1 
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Din~cting the l'.ourt's attention to the brief herein 
filed entitled "Brief of Arninrn Curiae In Support of 
Hespondent's Petition for Rehearing," Black's Law Dic-
tionary, Fomth 11~dition, at page 107: 
"AlilICUS CUHIAK Lat. A friend of the court. 
A by-stander (usually a counsellor) who inter-
]JOses and volunteers information upon some mat-
ter of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful 
or mistaken, Fort ·worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Great-
house, Tex.Civ. App., .U S.vV. 2d. 418, -122; or 
upon a matter of which the court may take judicial 
cognizance. The Claveresk, C.C.A.N.Y. 264 F. 276, 
279; In re Perry, 83 Ind. App. 456, 148 N.E. 163, 
1G5. Implies friendly intervention of counsel to 
remind court of legal matter which has escaped its 
notice, and regarding which it appears to be in 
danger of going ·wrong. Blanchard v. Boston & 
~1.R., 8G N.H. 263, 167 A. 158, 160. 
Also a person who has no right to appear in a 
suit but is allowed to introduce argument, author-
ity or evidence to protect his interests. Ladue v. 
Goodhead, 181 Misc. 807, 44 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787." 
It ·would seem that the term amicus curiae indicates 
an advisor to or friend of the court, not a position of 
advocacy. It will be noted that the brief, while purporting 
to be that of A. M. Ferro, of the Utah Municipal League, 
Eugene \V. Hansen, of the Utah State Association of 
County Officials, and Ronald N. Boyce, of the Salt Lake 
County Bar Legal Services, Inc., was signed by Ronald 
N. BoYce, solely, who puts himself in a position of repre-
senting the Salt Lake County Bar Legal Services, Inc., an 
Office of Economic Opportunity financed organization 
for indigents, who are in no ·way involved in, or affected 
by this litigation. 
The "friend of the court" begins his discussion under 
the heading, Pre-Emption in Utah Law, at page 3 of his 
brief with the statement: 
"It is submitted that the concept of State pre-
emption is alien to prior precedents from this 
court." 
apparently ignoring the quotes from Ogden City v. Mc-
Laughlin et al, 5 Utah 387, 16 P. 721 (1888) at pages 9 and 
10 of appellant's original brief herein, holding in effect 
that the compiled laws of Utah were controlling and 
Ogden City had no power to make an ordinance making 
it an offense to resort to a house of ill fame for lewdness. 
Quoting from the MCJL,aughlin case, supra, 
"Neither the charter of Ogden City (section 35), 
giving its power to restrain and punish prosti-
tutes, nor Compiled Laws of Utah, page 697, see-
tion 9, giving power to the city to suppress or 
restrain bawdy and other disorderly houses, and 
punish the keepers thereof, authorizes an ordi-
nance making it an offense to resort to a house of 
ill fame for lewdness.' 
The court further stated: 
"It is a general rule that a municipal corporation 
has only surh powers as are expressly grantr.d 
or essential thereto, or plainly implied therem 
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(again citing Dillon ~lunicipal Cor1)oration Sec-
. ' t1ons 89 and 91). And where there is a doubt 
as to the exish'nCt> of the authority such doubt . . ' 
1s resolved against the eorporation (again citing 
Dillon Municipal Corporation, Section 91)'' (page 
722) 
rn1e arnicus curiae brief goes on at pages 10 and 11 
to admit that the bulk of our sexual laws come from the 
territorial laws which were in effect at Statehood. Cali-
fornia City v. Pre-emption lJy hnplicatiun, 17 Hastings 
Law Journal, 603 ( 1966) is quoted by the Amicus Curiae 
brief and contains an interesting and exhaustive collec-
tion of authoritit>s upon the problem and citations of ju-
dicial rulings. However, the Amicus Curiae neglected to 
mention the case ·whieh is of primary importance therein. 
Th<c' same being In ReCarul Lane on habea:s corpus, 22 
Cal Reptr., 857, 372 P.2d. 897 (1962), wherein the Su-
preme Court of California on June 28, 1962, by a five-
two decision vacated the opinion in 18 Cal. Rptr., 33, 367 
P.2d. 673, and invalidated the ordinance under which 
Miss Lane had been charged with "resorting to a room 
for purposes of sexual intercourse," and holding at page 
899: 
"The Pen:al Code sections covering the criminal 
aspects of sexual activity are so extensive in their 
scope that they clearly show an intention by the 
Legislature to adopt a general scheme for the 
regulation of this subject." 
The opinion then cites the various sections of the 
California Penal Code referring to sexual activity m 
8 
any aspect. It should be noted that the l~tah Cod(~ n·-
ferring to sexual activity is even more extensive in it;,.; 
coverage than the California Code covering all aspeehi 
set forth in the Lane 01Jinion and in addition thereto 
making fornication a crime. 
In the Lane case there are 7:2 amicm; cunae eon-
stituting the district attorney for eaeh district in thl· 
State of California, several of the county attorney's 
offices, and many of the city attorney's offices from the 
principal municipalities in California. That case would 
appear to be on all fours with the case upon which re-
hearing is being presently sought ,to wit, Salt Lake City 
v. Allred, et al. The Lane case is charging the petitioner 
with resorting from her living room to her bedroom for 
the purpose of having sexual intercourse with a male 
not her husband. Citing from page 898 of 372 P.2d.: 
"(l) This is the sole question necessary for us 
to determine: Has the State adopted a general 
scheme for the regulation of the criminal aspects 
of sexual activity and determined, to the exclu-
sion of local regulation, when sexual intercoun;P 
between persons not manied to eaeh other shall 
be criminal~ 
Yes. 
(2) The Law: A local municipal ordinanel• is 
invalid if it attempts to impose additional re-
quirements in a field that is preempted by tlw 
general law. (Cal.Const., art. XI ~ 11; Abbott v. 
Citv of Los An (re les, 53 Cal.2d GI-I-, m~:2 3 Cal. . " 
Rptr. 15~, ::3-4-9 P.2d m-±; Ag·m·\\· V. Cit)- of Lo~ 
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Angele:::;, 51 Cal. 2d. 1,5(2), 3:30 P.:2d 385; r:L'olrnan 
v._ lTnderhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712(4), 249 P.2d 280; 
PL poly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 3G6, 370 ( 5), 125 P. 2d 
482, l-l-7 A.L.R. 515; Nat. .Milk de. Assn. v. Citv 
etc. of S. :F'., 20 Cal. 2d 101, 108(1), 124 P.2d 25:) 
( 3) ·whenever the Legislature has seen fit to 
adopt a general scheme for the J'egulation of a 
particular subjeet, the entire control over what-
ever phases of the subjeet are covered hy state 
legislation ceases as far as local legislation is 
concerned. (Pipoly v. Ben:son, supra, 20 Cal. 2d 
366, 371, 125 P.2d -t82, l-:!:7 A.L.R. 515.) 
( 4) In determining whether the Legislature in-
tended to occupy a particular field to the exclu-
sion of all local regulation we may look to the 
'whole purpose and scope of the legislative 
scheme' and are not required to find such an 
intent solely in the language used in the statute. 
(Tolman v. Underhill, supra, 39 Cal. 2d at p. 
712(6), 2-1-9 P.2d at p. 283; Abbott v. City of Los 
Angeles, supra, at pp. G82(9), 6S-t, 3 Cal. Rptr. 
158.) 
The Salt Lake City Ordinance 32-2-1, Revised Ordi-
nances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1965, goes far beyond 
the applicable and cornprehenseive field of regulation 
of sexual activity by our State Lmv. Said ordinance 
makes it unlawful for any person, male or female (not 
limited to prostititutes or lewd persons): (1) to commit, 
or offer to commit, or agree to commit, a lewd act. 
76-39-5 through 76-39-15 (76-39-1 to 76-39-4 Repealed) 
Laws of Utah 1965. An act of sexual intercourse for hire 
(no legislation applicable) or an act of moral perversion 
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(unintelligible, may refer to 76-53-22, Utah Uode Anno-
tated 1943); (2) Secure or offer another for a lewd 
act or act of sexual intercourse for hire, or of immoral 
perversion. (May come under 76-53-10 if le-wd act::;, 
sexual intercourse, for hire, or immoral pervernion can 
be termed prostitution) under our court::; definition 
thereof, but in any event preclude the guilt of a female 
person (Mrs. Allred) by the language of that act at 
lines 20-22 "with or for another male person;" ( 3) is 
above and beyond and in addition to any statutory pro-
hibition; ( 4) language relative to but not contained in 
76-39-5 through 76-39-15, Laws of Utah 1965; (5) may 
be contained in 76-53-8, if the acts set forth may be 
interpreted as prostitution under our courts definition; 
(6) same as (5) supra; ('7) comes under 76-53-10 but 
cannot ref er to any person thereunder as a woman is 
excluded by the language of the statute; (8) Aiders and 
abetters, comes under 76-1-44, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, if the acts in (l) through (7) constitute crimes. 
It is clear that the State law ha::; pre-empted the 
field herein attempted to be controlled by the Salt Lake 
City Commission. 
In the event the Court sees fit to grant a rehearing 
in the above entitled case, it is respectfully requsted that 
the Court consider Points II and III of appellant's initial 
brief, to-wit: 
Point 11-TlH" Ordinanc<-' is :so \Tague and Aw-
11 
biguous as to be Unconstitutional 
Point lll-rl1liat the ordinance in question at-
tempts to rnakl~ erime;-; of acts which are not 
crimes under the laws of the State of Utah 
r!1hese matters not having been dis<'ussed in the majority 
opinion on the basis of rnling on pre-emption. 
CONCLUSION 
It is urged that the court ignore the newspaper 
and television campaign regarding the above case in 
considering the petition for rehearing, and if rehearing 
is granted, that they consider all the points of validity 
and constitutionality of the ordinance attacked. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HA 'J1CH & McRAE 
